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Introduction and Existing Literature
Interbank markets are crucial for the functioning of the economy. However, as painfully illustrated by the global nancial crisis (GFC) in 2007/08, creating links at the micro-level may generate systemic risk at the macro-level.
Thus, the structure of the interbank network, with the banks having connections in terms of credit relationships, is important for its stability. The economy depends on stable interbank markets, since short-term money market rates aect those of longer maturities and thus the real economy. From this viewpoint, it appears quite surprising that the economic profession has not been concerned much with the functioning of interbank markets until recently. The usual focus is on the overnight segment of the interbank deposit market, since it tends to be the largest spot segment of money markets.
In this paper, we analyze the network properties of the Italian e-MID (electronic market for interbank deposits) data based on overnight loans during the period 1999-2010.
Most existing studies on the structure of real interbank markets have been conducted by physicists trying to get an idea of the topology of dierent interbank markets. Examples include Boss et al. (2004) Iori et al. (2008) for the Italian e-MID (electronic market for interbank deposits). The most important ndings reported in this literature are: (1) most interbank networks are quite large (e.g. more than 5000 banks in the Fedwire network), (2) interbank networks are sparse, meaning that only a minority of all possible links do actually exist, (3) degree distributions appear to be scale-free (with coecients between 2-3), (4) transaction volumes appear to follow scale-free distributions as well, (5) clustering coecients are usually quite small, (6) interbank networks are small worlds and (7) the networks show disassortative mixing with respect to the bank size, so small banks tend to trade with large banks and vice versa.
Most relevant for our study are the two papers on the e-MID. We should stress here that the e-MID data are the only interbank data which can be purchased freely without any restrictions. In contrast, getting access to similar datasets for other markets is usually far more complicated. The authors analyze daily networks from 1999-2002 and nd intradaily and intramonthly seasonalities. The authors conclude that the networks appear to be random at the daily level. This nding is in stark contrast with the ndings of preferential lending relationships in the Portuguese interbank market by Cocco et al. (2009) . In this paper, we are mostly concerned with matching these seemingly incompatible ndings, by showing that the aggregation period has an eect on the informational value of the underlying networks. The main nding is that daily networks indeed feature a substantial amount of randomness and cannot be considered as being representative for the underlying latent' network. This is illustrated on the basis of a number of network statistics which are compared to those of random networks. Furthermore, we nd a substantial amount of asymmetry in the network. Last but not least, we nd that the GFC can be identied as a signicant structural break for many network measures.
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The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief introduction into (interbank) networks, Section 3 introduces the Italian e-MID trading system and gives an overview of the data set we have access to. Section 4 describes our ndings and Section 5 concludes and discusses the relevance of these ndings for future research.
Networks
A network consists of a set of N nodes that are connected by M edges (links). Taking each bank as a node and the interbank positions between them as links, the interbank network can be represented as a square matrix of dimension N ×N (data matrix, denoted D). 3 O-diagonal elements are positive in the presence of a link and zero otherwise.
Interbank data usually give rise to directed, sparse and valued networks.
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However, much of the extant network research ignores the last aspect by focusing on binary adjacency matrices only. An adjacency matrix A contains elements a ij equal to 1, if there is a directed link from bank i to j and 0 otherwise. Since the network is directed, both A and D are asymmetric in general. In this paper, we also take into account valued information by using both the raw data matrix as well as a matrix containing the number of trades between banks, denoted as T. In some cases it is also useful to work with the undirected version of the adjacency matrices, A u , where a u ij = max(a ij , a ji ).
As usual, some data aggregation is necessary to represent the system as a network. In the following, we use quarterly networks.
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The Italian interbank market e-MID
The Italian electronic market for interbank deposits (e-MID) is a screenbased platform for trading of unsecured money-market deposits in Euros, USDollars, Pound Sterling, and Zloty operating in Milan through e-MID SpA.
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The market is fully centralized and very liquid; in 2006 e-MID accounted for 17% of total turnover in the unsecured money market in the Euro area. The trading mechanism follows a quote-driven market and is similar to a limit-order-book in a stock market, but without consolidation. The market is transparent in the sense that the quoting banks' IDs are visible to all other banks. Quotes contain the market side (buy or sell money), the volume, the interest rate and the maturity. Trades are registered when a bank (aggressor) actively chooses a quoted order. The platform allows for credit line checking before a transaction will be carried out, so trades have to be conrmed by 5 The vast majority of trades (roughly 95%) is conducted in Euro. 6 This development is driven by the fact that the market is unsecured. The recent nancial crisis made unsecured loans in general less attractive, with stronger impact for longer maturities. See below. It should be noted, that there is also a market for secured loans called e-MIDER. The minimum quote size is 1.5 million Euros, whereas the minimum trade size is only 50,000 Euros. Thus, aggressors do not have to trade the entire amount quoted.
7 Additional participant requirements, for example a certain amount of total assets, may pose an upward bias on the size of the participating banks. In any case, e-MID covers essentially the entire domestic overnight deposit market in Italy.
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We have access to all registered trades in Euro in the period from January 1999 to December 2010. For each trade we know the two banks' ID numbers (not the names), their relative position (aggressor and quoter), the maturity and the transaction type (buy or sell). As mentioned above, the majority of trades is conducted overnight and due to the global nancial crisis (GFC) markets for longer maturities essentially dried up. We will focus on all overnight trades conducted on the platform, leaving a total number of 1,317,679 trades. The large sample size of 12 years allows us to analyze the network evolution over time. Here we focus on the quarterly aggregates, leaving us with 48 snapshots of the network.
Results
In this section, we look at the network structures formed by interbank lending over various horizons of time aggregation of the underlying data. We will see that comparing various network measures at dierent levels of time aggregation reveals interesting features suggestive of underlying behavioral regularities. Given that most studies focus on overnight data, it has become quite standard to focus on networks constructed from daily data. Here we nd, that, at least for the Italian interbank network, it may be more sensible to focus on longer aggregation periods, namely monthly or quarterly data.
We also discuss in how far the network structure has changed (and, in how far it has remained intact) after the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
7 The minimum quote size could pose an upward bias for participating banks. It would be interesting to check who are the quoting banks and who are the aggressors. Furthermore it would be interesting to look at quote data, as we only have access to actual trades. 8 More details can be found on the e-MID website, see http://www.e-mid.it/. It is also interesting to highlight some specic features of the trading behavior of individual banks in this particular quarter, since not all banks use the market in the same way:
11 There are 14 banks with zero in-degree and 29 banks with zero out-degree. Surprisingly these banks are quite heterogeneous and not, as one might expect, just small banks. As an example the highest overall transaction volume of 58.6 bn Euro for a single bank, and therefore roughly 9.3% of the total trading volume, was traded by a German bank borrowing this sum in 90 trades from 8 counterparties. Another interesting case is an Italian bank trading only with one counterparty, lending this other bank 5.02 billion Euro in 76 trades, whereas borrowing just 0.03 billion in 3 trades. Even though these special relationships are quite interesting, the anonymity of the data set makes it impossible for us to say more on the particular relationships that might lead to these interesting outcomes. After this broad overview of the market and the ongoing interactions, we turn to the question of a sensible aggregation period. As should be clear from the 11 For a detailed analysis of the trading strategies in the e-MID, see Fricke (2012) . 
Density
The density ρ of a network is dened as the number of existing links (M ) relative to the maximum possible number of links. It can be calculated as
.
(1) Figure 5 illustrates the evolution of the density for four dierent aggregation periods (day, month, quarter, year). Except for the daily networks the density is quite stable over time and slightly increases until the GFC, which was a signicant structural break for the monthly and quarterly network. We should note that the breakpoint (quarter 39), coincides with the quarter during which Lehman Brothers collapsed. The daily density uctuates much more strongly, but overall increases throughout the sample.
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Compared to the ndings for other interbank networks, the density of the Italian interbank network is quite high. For example, Bech and Atalay (2010) and Soramäki et al. (2006) report an average density of below 1% in daily interbank networks, compared to an average density of roughly 3.1% in our 13 The means of 20.8% for quarterly aggregated networks (13.4% monthly) reveal much higher gures. Obviously the network density is positively related to the aggregation period, but to our knowledge the structure of this relation has not been investigated for interbank networks so far.
For this reason, we compare the aggregation properties of the empirical networks with those of random networks. Here we use Erdös-Renyi networks,
i.e. completely random networks, and random scale-free networks, where the out-degrees follow a power-law distribution with scaling parameter 2.3.
14 The 12 The density for the total network, including the foreign banks, seems to steadily decline over the sample period. This illustrates the fact that the increasing fraction of foreign banks are less interconnected with the (smaller) Italian banks.
13 Additionally, the electronic nature of the trading platform might make links between any two institutions more likely.
14 The power-law distribution with tail exponent 2.3 is a common nding in many interbank markets, see e.g. Boss et al. (2004) . The resulting sequences of the out-degrees are attributed to the nodes by ranking those according to the observed out-degrees, considering only active banks during the particular day. Note that if we did not account for the ordering of the observed degree sequences, we would end up with very similar aggregation properties as the Erdös-Renyi case. The in-degrees are distributed in a random uniform way, ruling out self-links and counting each link at most once. For a detailed analysis of the degree distributions for this data set see . 15 Note that the density of aggregated Erdös-Renyi networks can be written as
where (1 − ρ r t ) is the probability of observing no links in the network at time t whatsoever, but since we adjust the number of active banks on a daily basis using tese probabilities would not constitute a completely satisfactory approach in our case. Scale-Free (red) with α = 2.3, and observed networks (green). Aggregation period in days. Note: we do not plot standard deviations, since these are negligible.
As an example, Figure 6 illustrates the results for 1999. For all three
networks, there appears to be a saturation level for the density, however at dierent levels. The Erdös-Renyi networks always show the highest density (up to .851), followed by the Scale-Free networks (up to .559) and the observed networks (only up to .280). Apparently, it is much more likely for the empirical data that the same link gets activated several times than for the randomized data of Erdös-Renyi and scale-free networks (where the overall number of links is the same by construction). This is supported by the fact that in the observed networks a total number of 2, 757 links are observed only once in the year, while for the scale-free and random networks these values are 5, 040 and 5, 746, respectively. Hence, these results indicate the existence of lasting (preferential) lending relationships in the actual banking network.
What is a Sensible Aggregation Period?
After showing that longer than daily aggregation tends to reveal non-random structures for the Italian banking network, we are concerned with determining the`correct' aggregation period in more detail in this section. This question is crucial for extracting relevant information, since the banking network cannot be observed at a given point in time, but always has to be approxi-12 mated by aggregating trades over a certain period.
16 Most studies use daily aggregates (daily networks), which seems justied by the fact that the underlying loans are (mostly) overnight. Economically, however, overnight loans can be seen as longer-term loans, where the lender can decide every day whether to prolong the loan or not. Aggregating over a longer period is only preferable, if it can reveal a non-random structure of the banking network.
The existence of preferential relationships would imply that daily transactions are not determined myopically, but that a virtual network of longer lasting relationships exists. Daily transactions would then be akin to random draws from this underlying network with the realizations depending on current liquidity needs and liquidity overhang. Aggregation over a suciently long time horizon might reveal more and more of the hidden links, rather than adding up purely random draws from all possible links. The relatively fast saturation of the empirical density that we observe in gure 6 is consistent with this interpretation. To shed more light on this issue
we consider the consistency of yearly, quarterly, monthly and daily aggregated networks. The main nding is that we observe a much higher degree of structural stability for monthly or quarterly networks, depending on the application, rather than daily networks.
The use of a`sensible' aggregation period should ensure that we extract stable features (if they exist) of the banking network rather than noisy trading patterns at dierent points in time. In this regard, it is important to investigate the stability of the link structure, in order to assess whether subsequent occurrences of the network share many common links. In order to do this, we rely on the Jaccard Index (JI), 17 which can be used to quantify the similarity of two sample sets in general. Here it is dened as
where S xy counts the number of relations having status a ij = x at the rst instance and a ij = y at the second. The JI measures links which survive as a fraction of links which are established at any of the two points in time.
Hence, it also takes into account those banks which are active in only one of the two periods. Figure 7 shows that the JI is very stable over time for longer aggregation periods, but not for the daily level. As expected, the JI tends to 16 The literature on interbank networks is surprisingly silent about the choice of the aggregation period. We are aware of only one paper (Kyriakopoulos et al. (2009) ) investigating this issue. 17 The so-called graph correlation, see e.g. Butts and Carley (2001) , shows qualitatively very similar results, but is not able to cope with banks entering or exiting market. The correlation of both measures is always above .9 irrespective of the aggregation period. and yearly (blue) networks.
be higher for longer aggregation intervals. The daily measures are much more unstable and increase substantially until the GFC. More problematic than the smaller average level are however the extreme outliers on the downside.
As a rule-of-thumb, in social network analysis one considers networks with JI values above .3 as substantially stable.
18 Table 1 shows the mean, minimum, 10th percentile and standard deviation of the JIs for dierent aggregation periods. Again, the most evident observation is that the daily networks are rather special: the minimum and the 10th percentile of the JI are signicantly smaller, indicating that we ob- 19
These results suggest a high degree of randomness in the daily networks.
Obviously, higher values of the JI are no guarantee that we are closer to the`real' network per se. Note that in a network with randomly drawn connections, the index should be positively related to the length of the aggregation period. Thus, it is important to show that other network measures also take on values signicantly dierent from random networks for longer aggregation periods. In the following, we will therefore have a closer look at the reciprocity of the network.
Reciprocity is a global concept for directed networks that measures how many of the existing links are mutual. It can be calculated by adding up all loops of length two, i.e. reciprocal links, and dividing them by the total number of links. Figure 8 illustrates the results for 1999, where we perform a similar analysis as for the density above, by comparing the observed network reciprocity to those of Erdös-Renyi and scale-free random networks.
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The actual values are, again, always the lowest. The right panel of Figure 8 shows that the reciprocity (after 19 days for the real network) exceeds the density for all 19 We should note that, as apparent from Figure 7 , the reason for the 10th percentile to be below the .2 threshold is not the GFC. 20 A structural break (after the GFC) is detected by a Chow-test as well as an additional CUSUM test for the 10th year, the 39th quarter and the 117th month respectively, but not for daily networks. For the yearly networks only the Chow-test indicates a structural break. Note that the yearly analysis involves only 12 data points. 21 Again the results are qualitatively very similar for the other years as well. On the base of the Jaccard index, monthly and quarterly networks appear most stable as they have a high index with a very low standard deviation, i.e., the highest degree of structural stability of lending relationships over time.
Yearly aggregation levels, in contrast, have somewhat higher variation in their JI and might be problematic, because the banking network (in particular during unstable times) is likely to evolve much faster. Somewhat related is the change in the composition of banks, i.e. banks leaving and entering the market, since we consider a bank as active for the whole year even if it leaves the market after the rst trading day.
23 Concerning the monthly level, Iori et al. (2008) discovered intradaily and -monthly seasonalities which may aect our results. In everything that follows, we will therefore mostly focus on the quarterly networks.
Transitivity
Here we are interested in transitive relations between three banks. The concept of transitivity states that a specic relationship is transitive if from i j and j k it follows that i k holds. Equality is a transitive relation, but inequality is not.
The relation we are interested in is i has a link to j or a ij = 1. The relationship is obviously not transitive, since i has a link to j and j has a link to k does not strictly imply that k also has a link to i. However, it is interesting to investigate how many such closed triplets occur. More generally speaking, transitivity measures whether the existence of certain links depend both on the relation between the two counterparties and on the existence of links with a third party. The measure most prominently used for this purpose is the (directed) clustering coecient 24 , which, despite its name, has 23 This problem occurs for each aggregation period, but is likely to become more pronounced for longer frequencies. 24 For more detailed denitions of clustering coecients see Zhou (2002) . no relation to cluster identication whatsoever.
25 It measures the number of (directed) paths of length two in the network and takes the fraction of these which are closed.
26 Figure 9 illustrates two ways to close the triplet i, j, k in a directed network. First, the directed path may be closed into a loop as shown on the left hand side of the gure. The function of such closure is given by the coecient CC 1 :
Second, the link from i to k may be reversed. The function of such closure is given by the coecient:
An important distinction is that the nodes in the case of CC 1 , as apparent from Figure 9 , have each one in-and one outgoing link and therefore show no hierarchical ordering. Figure 10 shows that the results for the two coecients are very dierent. The mean for CC 1 is .164 and .571 for CC 2 . This is further evidence for the non-random character of the banking network, since the probability of an`average' link to exist is just equal to the density of .208. Hence, the existence of a path of length two between i and k via j makes it 2.75 times more likely that the link from i to k exists compared to a random link 27 , but reduces the probability that there is a link from k to i by 21%. The huge dierence indicates that the banking network has a hierarchical ordering on the triadic level. Figure 11 illustrates that for the Erdös-Renyi networks the evolution of the clustering coecients is almost identical (correlation above .999). The exact numbers of the clustering coecients for the observed networks change with the aggregation, but CC 1 is always much smaller than CC 2 for all aggregation levels as shown by gure. CC 2 is at the beginning even higher for the observed network than for the random networks, but saturates after a steep increase relatively quickly on a much lower level (up to .624). CC 1 on the other hand is almost zero at the beginning. Note that a loop of length three at a single day implies that each involved bank would get back some 25 See Fricke and Lux (2012) and Fricke (2012) for detailed approaches of cluster identication in the e-MID market.
26 Any connection along directed links between two nodes i and j is called a path and the length of the path is dened as the number of edges crossed. There are no restrictions on visiting a node or link more than once alongside a path. 27 The probability of random link is exactly the density of .208. 
Small-World Property
Another very prominent measure in the network literature is the average shortest path length (ASPL). Interest in this measure stems from the remarkable nding that in many`real world' networks the ASPL is quite small, also known as the small-world phenomenon.
28 Here we focus on the undirected version of the network. Watts and Strogatz (1998) show that completely random networks already have a very small ASPL, but at the same time a relatively low (undirected) clustering coecient (CC) equal to its density. On the other hand, a regular network, where all nodes have connections to their s nearest neigh-28 Small ASPLs have been detected for social, information, technological and biological networks. The rst empirical nding dates back to the chain letter experiments conducted by Milgram (1967) . His nding that on average only six acquaintances are needed to form a link between two random selected persons led to the famous phrase of`six degrees of separation'. In this case a comparison of the networks aggregated day by day is not suitable, since the density of both random networks as visible in gure 6 after 29 It is not necessary for two nodes to have a shortest path, since there might be no link leading from one to the other. In this case the two nodes lie in dierent components of the network and by convention the length of these non existing geodesic paths are set to innity. The undirected banking network consists always of only one component and the same is true for the investigated random networks, because of the high density. This indicates the higher regularity in the link structure. Hence, the banking network lies midway between regular and completely random graphs. As can be seen from the last column of Here we investigate the change in banks' behavior during and after the breakdown of Lehman Brothers. To begin with, Table 4 contains several basic network statistics for ten quarters around the breakpoint (quarter 39).
Interestingly, the number of active Italian banks remained relatively stable during this period, and in fact 86 banks were active in all of the ten quarters.
The stability of this composition is important, since under these circumstances changes in the behavior of the banks on the aggregated or individual level should be mainly driven by their response to this exogenous shocks.
We also see that the total trading volume, the number of trades and the number of links are all decreasing over this period, but the exact patterns are distinct. Surprisingly, the volume is quite stable until the 40th quarter, but drops by 39.3 percent in the 41st quarter. In contrast, the number of trades starts to fall in the 39th quarter and decreases further until quarter 44. The total number of links already starts to decrease in quarter 37, but overall tends to develop in a very similar way to the number of trades. In this paper, we have investigated the interbank lending activity as documented in the e-MID data from 1999 until the end of 2010 from a network perspective. Our main nding is that daily networks feature too much randomness to be considered a representative statistic of some underlying latent network. The JI shows the higher consistency over time for longer aggregation periods and the very low density compared to (aggregated) random networks indicates the existence of preferred trading relations. In general the evolution of all global network measures for longer aggregation periods (month, quarter, year) is very similar in their deviation from the Erdös-Enyi and scale-free benchmarks. Moreover, the monthly and quarterly networks are characterized by a signicantly higher than random clustering coecient, and thus reveal some regularity in the link structure. The (almost) zero reciprocity and CC 1 of daily networks proves the inability of this aggregation level to reveal information on such structural elements. However, quarterly networks consistently exhibit a non-random structure and allow us to con-33 The correlation between both is .963 for this period and .957 over the complete sample. 34 show that most of these changes were in fact driven by behavioral changes of core banks. 35 As noted above, this is not true for loans longer than overnight. These markets essentially collapsed completely, which is not surprising given that the loans are unsecured.
sider the mutuality of the relations and are therefore a preferable subject of study, especially if one is interested in the evolution of the network over time.
Essentially, these results show that it is far from trivial to map a given data structure into a`network'. While daily records of the interbank trading system can be arranged in an adjacency matrix and treated with all types of network statistics, they provide probably only a very small sample of realizations from a richer structure of relationships. Just like daily contacts of humans provide very incomplete information of networks of friendship and acquaintances, the daily interbank data might only provide a small selection of existing, dormant established trading channels. Hence, inference based on such high-frequency data may be misleading while a higher level of time aggregation might provide a more complete view on the interbank market.
What level of aggregation is sucient for certain purposes is an empirical question depending on the research questions at hand. However, saturation of certain measures may be a good indicator that most dormant links have been activated at least once over a certain time horizon. At the same time, such dependence of statistics on the time horizon serves to sort out a number of simple generating mechanisms (i.e. completely randomly determined networks in every period) and reveal interesting dynamic structure.
Another interesting result is that the network is asymmetrical in many respects. For the quarterly network the fraction of reciprocal links is very similar to the density. Furthermore, the two directed clustering coecients are very dierent. The probability for path of length two to be closed into a loop is 3.48 times smaller than the other way. Additionally, the correlation between in-and out-degree is merely .12 for the complete sample. Therefore, the information that a bank has a a large number of incoming links is a surprisingly poor indicator of how many outgoing links the bank has.
Moreover, for many measures the GFC could be identied as a structural break and also the decreasing number of volume, trades and links support that the GFC heavily aected the Italian interbank market. However, the network overall remained surprisingly stable and despite the decrease of its volume (in the beginning of 2010) the e-MID market was never close to drying up completely.
In the future more attention should be given to the analysis of directed banking networks using longer aggregation periods to identify structural commonalities. This has important consequences for the regulation of credit institutions, since at the daily level it is dicult to detect the systemically important institutions. For policymakers and regulators, it would be potentially (dangerously) misleading to focus on the noisy daily networks, even more since the low level of connectivity suggests a low-degree of systemic risk at any point in time. More important, in our view, is to get a better idea on
